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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN T H E M A T T E R OF T H E 
E S T A T E A N D G U A R D I A N -
S H I P OF J O A N O E L E R I C H , 
Incompetent. 
H E L E N D. O E L E R I C H , 
Petitioner and Appellant, Case No. 10005 
vs. 
J O A N O E L E R I C H , 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from an order in the guardianship 
proceeding dismissing the petition for appointment of a 
guardian of the estate and person of Joan Oelerich, 
alleged to be incompetent. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The District Judge dismissed the petition of Helen 
D. Oelerich, mother of Joan Oelerich, for appointment 
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of Walker Bank & Trust Company as guardian on the 
grounds that the petitioner had not been diligent in 
proceeding with the action, and that a Trust Agreement 
had been executed whereby the First National Bank of 
Chicago had been appointed Trustee of certain property 
received by Joan Oelerich from her father's estate. The 
order was granted without a hearing on the merits of 
the petition and without any determination of the in-
competency of Joan Oelerich. 
* • * •• * • • • * * * • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order vacating and setting 
aside the order of dismissal of the petition for appoint-
ment of guardian and requiring the District Court to 
determine the issues of fact raised by such petition, and 
upon such determination, that a guardian of the person 
and property of Joan Oelerich be appointed. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Most of the relevant facts pertinent to a consider-
ation of the issues raised on appeal are contained in the 
verified Petition for Appointment of Guardian (R. 5-6) 
and the Affidavit of Helen D. Oelerich filed on or about 
March 14, 1962 (R. 35-38). 
The first four paragraphs of this Statement of 
Facts are substantiated by these portions of the Record 
on Appeal. 
4 
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The Petitioner, Helen D. Oelerich, is the mother 
of the respondent, Joan Oelerich. Petitioner is a resident 
of Cook County, Illinois. Joan was born February 1.7, 
1938. At the age of 16, after having become pregnant 
by one Burtis Bishop, she was married to Bishop on 
November 27, 1954. A child was born to her on May 5, 
1955. She was divorced from Bishop in 1955 at the age 
of 17. In the latter part of 1956, respondent became 
pregnant again by a person whose name was not known 
to the mother. She was examined at that time by Dr. 
Ernest M. Solomon, a licensed physician, and Dr. Jules 
Gelperjn, a psychiatrist. Dr. Solon^on reported to the 
Highland Park Hospital at Highland Park, Illinois 
that Joan was suicidal, withdrawn, acutely depressed 
and hard to contact. Dr. Gilperin reported to the same 
committee that she was suicidal and pre-psychotic and 
that unless an abortion was performed, either suicidal 
or severe suicidal depression would occur. Upon their 
recommendations an abortion was performed by Dr. 
Solomon on August 14, 1956. Subsequently Joan was 
referred by Dr. Solomon to Dr. Gilperin for psycho-
therapy. Dr. Solomon reported that she was not likely 
to recover without such treatment. Joan received psycho-
therapy from Dr. Gilperin for a short period but 
apparently abandoned her treatment. 
During the last few days of September, 1959, Joan 
met one George Holle in an elevator in a Chicago hotel. 
Approximately a week later, on October 4, 1959, she 
suddenly took her four-year-old child, left her mother's 
home and went with Holle to Indiana where she lived 
5 
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with Holle's wife and his children. Soon after her arrival 
in Indiana, Joan was induced by Holle to deliver to 
him the sum of $10,000, which he used to repay a debt 
owed by him. On March 9, 1962, when her affidavit was 
filed, Joan's mother stated on information and belief 
that no part of that money had ever been returned to 
Joan. 
On November 19, 1959, less than six weeks after 
Joan's arrival in Indiana, her mother visited her and 
Holle at Holle's home. At that time Holle assaulted 
Joan's mother and knocked her unconscious. When she 
recovered, Mrs. Oelerich saw her daughter, Joan, stand-
ing nearby, laughing hysterically and saying "I didn't 
see a thing." On several subsequent occasions Joan told 
various persons that she was "extremely confused and 
unhappy and did not know what strange influence was 
keeping her in Indiana." During Joan's stay in Indiana 
she became pregnant by Holle. In or about October, 
1960, Holle brought her to Salt Lake City. Holle was 
a truck driver commuting between Salt Lake City and 
Indiana. While he was in Salt Lake City he lived with 
Joan and while he was in Indiana he lived with his law-
ful wife and children. 
On or about March 16, 1961, the child of Joan and 
Holle, then only a few weeks old, died, apparently from 
suffocation or a respiratory ailment. 
> On December 21, 1961, petitioner filed her "Peti-
tion for Appointment of Guardian" in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County alleging that Joan was a 
6 
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resident of Salt Lake County, approximately 23 years 
of age, and "is . . . by reason of her mental condition . .> 
unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care 
of her property; and is likely to be deceived or imposed 
upon by artful or designing persons . . . " The petition 
alleged that Joan's mother had approximately $14,000 
which belonged to respondent, and in addition, Joan 
was going to receive a sum in excess of $250,000 as a 
result of the probate of the estate of her father, Joseph 
F . Oelerich. The petition alleged that " . . . it is necessary 
and convenient that this court appoint a fit and suitable 
person to be the guardian of her person and estate and 
to properly care for, control and manage her person 
and estate." Inasmuch as she had no immediate relatives 
in the state of Utah, petitioner nominated Walker Bank 
& Trust Company and alleged that it was willing to act 
as the guardian of Joan's person and estate." (R, 5-6). 
Joan appeared, through attorneys, and moved that 
the petition be dismissed (R. 7). She also filed an answer 
in which she admitted the fact that she was to receive 
assets from her father's estate and denied most of the 
other allegations of the petition (R. 7-10). The matter 
was referred to the trial calendar on January 10, 1962. 
Ray S. McCarty and his associates were the original 
attorneys for the petitioner. They filed a notice to take 
the deposition of Joan upon oral interrogatories in Feb-
ruary, 1962, but it does not appear from the file that her 
deposition was ever taken. In March, 1962, they filed a 
motion for an order to compel Joan to submit to a 
7 
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mental examination (R. 25-26). On March 6, counsel 
served upon the attorney for respondent a notice that 
depositions would be taken of the keeper of records of 
the Highland Park Hospital, Highland Park, Illinois, 
in Chicago. A notice to take the depositions of Dr. Jules 
Gilperin, Dr. Ernest M. Solomon and Dr. H . H . 
Garner in Chicago was filed and apparently a motion 
to vacate the notice was filed by the respondent. The 
motion to vacate was denied by an order dated February 
5, 1962 (R. 30). I t appears from the records in the 
District Court that these depositions were taken, but 
they are not published and are not before the court in 
the instant proceeding. There was a hearing on March 
16, 1962 on petitioner's objections to certain requests 
for admissions. 
In a "Reply Affidavit" dated March 14,1962, Joan 
denied many of the allegations of her mother's prior 
affidavit. She denied that she was in need of psychiatric 
treatment or examination and stated that she had 
6
'divested herself of control of her property through the 
creation of an irrevocable trust and she has appointed 
the Honorable J . Bracken Lee of Salt Lake City, as 
Trustee, and that he is now entitled to act as her Trustee, 
on her behalf and in her stead, until removed by order 
of the Court or otherwise." 
-•/•:<. At that time Joan still claimed to be domiciled in 
Indiana but that "she still resides in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah" (R. 57-58). In April, 1962, Joan filed, 
through her attorneys, various motions, one of which 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was to continue the lawsuit without date and to "dismiss 
the motions presently before the court in this matter" 
and to approve the trust agreement with J . Bracken Lee 
and its supplement, and "to require an annual account-
ing of the same before this Court under whose juris-
diction it shall remain unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court." Joan's attorneys withdrew October 8,1962, and 
Ray S. McCarty and H. G. Metos withdrew as attor-
neys for petitioner April 16, 1963. Merlin O. Baker, 
an associate of the firm of Ray, Quinney and Nebeker, 
appeared as counsel for petitioner on July 9, 1963. Dur-
ing the four or five months preceding August 26, 1963, 
there were settlement negotiations between counsel for 
the parties (R. 135). After approval by the attorneys, 
the settlement proposal was rejected by Joan (R. 136). 
No showing was made or prof erred by respondent that 
a delay in the hearing was prejudicial to her in any 
manner (R. 136). On June 28, 1963, present counsel 
for Joan appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the peti-
tion on the ground that "Petitioner has not been diligent 
in proceeding with the action" and that the First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago had been named trustee in an 
agreement "which completely protects the property of 
Joan Oelerich . . . from artful or designing persons" 
(R. 74-75). 
On June 28,1963, Virginia Kelly, a cousin of Joan, 
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had lunch 
with Joan in Chicago in February. (R. 86). i 
"During the course of said luncheon, Joan 
Oelerich caused a scene by screaming 'They are 
9 
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trying to call me a murderer,' referring to the 
death of her illegitimate daughter, Dawn Holle, 
in Utah. During the course of this luncheon, Joan 
Oelerich repeatedly made irrational statements, 
and her conduct and manner was such that it 
appeared to affiant that, in the opinion of affiant, 
•>*;.' Joan Oelerich was then mentally or emotionally 
. disturbed. 
"4. Several years ago, before she moved to 
Utah, Joan Oelerich received psychiatric treat-
ment in Illinois. 
"5. Affiant is informed and believes that since 
;
 s moving to Utah, Joan Oelerich has been cohabit-
, ing illicitly with one George Holle, despite the 
fact that her young daughter, Star Bishop, lives 
in the same home." 
The file does not reflect the present alleged marital 
status of George Holle. At a hearing held in April, 
1962, respondent's counsel referred to her as Miss 
Oelerich and she gave her name as Joan Oelerich (R. 
156), but upon cross-examination she admitted that the 
bills she had presented into court were in the name of 
George Holle and she used the names Joan Holle, Joan 
Oelerich and Joan Oelerich Holle (R. 163). 
There was no hearing on the merits of the petition 
for letters of guardianship. The court made no determi-
nation as to whether the trust agreement between the 
Chicago bank and respondent was subject to revocation 
by agreement of the trustee and the beneficiaries. There 
was no determination as to whether Joan had any assets 
other than those allegedly delivered to the trustee. There 
10 
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was no determination as to whether Joan was competent 
to determine her own needs for support, maintenance 
or education which presumably may be satisfied by the 
distributor of trust income. 
And it is undisputed that there is nothing in the 
trust instrument or otherwise in the record in this pro-
ceeding to indicate that there is any fiduciary acting for 
Joan which would serve as a substitute for a guardian 
of her person. The court made no effort to determine 
whether a guardianship of her person was required 
under the circumstances in this proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
T H E COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
T H E PETITION ON T H E GROUNDS OF 
F A I L U R E TO PROSECUTE W I T H DILI-
GENCE. 
This court said, in King Bros. Inc. v. Utah Dry 
Kilne Co. (1962), 13 Ut(2d) 399, 374P(2d) 254: 
"From the standpoint of the administration of 
justice, it is wise and desirable to adhere to a 
policy of being reluctant to turn a party out of 
court without trial. I t can justifiably be done 
only if the party could not in any event establish 
a right to recover." Citing Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel (1953), 123 Ut. 289, 259 P . (2d) 297. 
Sustaining the action of the trial court for refusing 
to dismiss an action which had been on file for three 
11 
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years, this court held in Wright v. Howe, et al. (1915), 
46 Ut. 588, 150 P . 956 that: ; 
"This court, in a number of decisions, has 
clearly indicated that it is the policy of the law to 
have cases tried and determined upon the merits 
whenever such a course is possible, and where it 
does not clearly invade the rights of one of the 
parties." 
The court indicated that where failure to obtain a 
hearing speedily was not prejudicial, and particularly 
where the hearing might be held at the instance of the 
movant, dismissal without a hearing was improper. 
"Merely failing to prosecute an action is not 
sufficient to show prejudice. This is especially 
true where the defendant may himself press the 
action to trial." 
In Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins 
(1959), 8 Ut(2d) 389, 335 P . (2d) 624, this court held 
that the dismissal of an action which had been pending 
for eight years for failure to prosecute constituted an 
abuse of discretion where there had been equal oppor-
tunity for both parties to keep it moving. 
"Since any party to this action could have ob-
tained the relief to which it was entitled at any 
time it had wanted, but both parties chose to 
dally a number of years, it was an abuse of dis-
cretion for the court to grant respondent's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice." 
In the instant case, the record reflects the fact that 
any delay in a determination of the issues on their merits 
12 
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was prompted more by delaying tactics of the respon-
dent than by lack of aggressiveness of the petitioner. 
Petitioner took three depositions after respondent's 
motion to vacate notice of their taking was denied (R. 
14-15). The respondent filed two motions to dismiss the 
petition, both of which were denied (R. 22). Respondent 
resisted petitioner's motion for an order to compel the 
alleged incompetent to submit to a mental examination. 
The record reflects that on April 11, 1962, respondent 
filed a motion for an order "to continue this lawsuit with-
out date" (R. 69). I t appears that this motion and others 
came on for hearing on April 17, 1962 and were taken 
under advisement (R. 68). I t does not appear that any 
further orders were made in the case until the end of 
June, 1963, when new counsel for the respondent filed 
a motion to dismiss upon the grounds of lack of diligence 
and execution of the trust agreement (R. 74-75). In this 
posture, who is to say which party failed to move with 
reasonable diligence? The court had taken under advise-
ment certain motions of the respondent. At the time the 
respondent filed her motion, she had been negotiating 
through her attorneys for four or five months with the 
attorneys for the petitioner to work out a settlement 
of the matter, and the record is that the settlement was 
rejected by the respondent after it had been approved 
by her attorneys (R. 135-136). 
The net effect of the court order was to hold peti-
tioner responsible for a continuance of the lawsuit with-
out date upon respondent's motion. I t is little wonder 
that the respondent was able to demonstrate any privi-
13 
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lege as a result of the court having taken her motion 
for continuance under advisement. 
I t is submitted that reasonable fairness required 
that at the least, petitioner should have been given an 
opportunity to take additional steps in preparation for 
hearing or to prosecute the case in some other manner 
before an order of dismissal was entered. The ruling 
of the trial court constituted a flagrant abuse of dis-
cretion under Rule 41(b), and conflicts with the cases 
cited by this court before and after the adoption of 
the Rule. 
POINT II. 
T H E COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE PETITION ON T H E GROUNDS THAT 
A TRUST AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED 
INTO W I T H FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF 
CHICAGO. 
A. The court erred in failing to determine whether 
the alleged trust agreement was a valid substitute for a 
guardianship procedure insofar as the assets of the ward 
are concerned. 
Insofar as reference to the Trust Agreement was 
concerned, it is not clear whether the court considered 
the respondent's motion of June 28, 1963 as the equi-
valent of a motion for summary judgment or as a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In either event, 
14 
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the granting of the motion was in flagrant violation of 
the Rule. The motion may be regarded as one for a 
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the 
respondent. If Rule 56 had been followed, petitioner 
would have had an opportunity to submit affidavits or 
to make any other appropriate showing essential to 
justify her opposition. See Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, paragraphs (e) and (f). Petitioner would 
have had an opportunity to take respondent's deposition. 
The depositions of the three doctors taken in Chicago 
could have been published. There could have been ap-
propriate opportunity to explore the provisions of the 
trust and the possibility of revocation by the trustee and 
beneficiary without the consent of the petitioner or the 
court. I t should be noted in this respect that during the 
spring of 1962, respondent's counsel represented to the 
court that an irrevocable trust agreement had been 
entered into between respondent and J . Bracken Lee, 
yet this instrument must have been revoked by the 
parties before the trust agreement with the Chicago 
bank could have been effected. The record is silent upon 
the disposition of the earlier trust instrument. 
The trial judge ruled upon the respondent's motion 
in the face of the holdings by this court that a summary 
judgment ''which turns a party out of court without an 
opportunity to present his evidence, is a harsh measure 
that should be granted only when, taking the view most 
favorable to the parties' claim and any proof that might 
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no event 
prevail." Kidman v. White (1963), 14 Ut(2d) 142, 
15 
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378 P (2d) 898. To the same effect is Samms v. Eccles 
(1961), 11 Ut(2d) 289, 358 P(2d) 344. 
The trial court's assumption that the trust agree-
ment ''completely protects the property of Joan Oele-
rich from artful or designing persons" is gratuitous and 
and is unsupported by the record. Aside from the fact 
that no hearing was held to make a determination of 
such fact, it is apparent from the instrument itself that 
the agreement is applicable only to the assets thereto-
fore held by the conservator of Joan's father's estate 
(R. 76-83). Petitioner alleged in her original petition 
that there was at least $14,000 belonging to Joan which 
was held outside of the estate (R. 5). There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that Joan does not own other 
assets or that she will not acquire other assets during the 
ten-year term of the trust, either from her mother or gift 
from any other person, or otherwise. Is it unreasonable 
to suppose that Joan is not now or will not become, in 
the next ten years, the beneficiary of gifts from her 
mother or from other persons? In view of the means 
within the family, is it not likely that Joan's mother 
or other persons may desire to make direct gifts to her in 
view of possible savings in inheritance taxes, estate taxes 
and other applicable consideration of modern day estate 
planning? Moreover, is the court to engage in the pre-
sumption in these circumstances without any support 
in the record that Joan may not have or acquire property 
of her own independent of any activities of other mem-
bers of the Oelerich family? Is the trust vested? If the 
trust is vested, what is to prevent the beneficiary from 
16 
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conveying her interest? I t is true that article 4 contains 
some restrictive agreements with respect to alienation. 
I t is submitted, however, that the ruling of the court 
below precludes any inquiry as to the application of 
these provisions to factual possibilities which may exist 
during the term of the trust. 
The point is that the ruling of the trial court negated 
any opportunity for exploration of the relevant facts 
and circumstances involved. There was no occasion 
afforded to present any evidence, either by way of affi-
davit of examination of witnesses, or otherwise. I t is 
submitted that Judge Hanson's ruling was in direct 
opposition to the admonition of this court in Samms v. 
Eccles, supra, to the effect that the partie's ''contentions 
must be considered in the light most to her advantage 
and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting her to go 
to trial; and only if the whole matter is so viewed, she 
could, nevertheless establish no right of recovery, should 
the motion be granted." 
B. Even assuming the trust instrument adequately 
safeguarded the property during the term of the trust, 
it was inadequate in failing to supply the needs of a 
guardian for the person of the respondent. 
Our statutes contemplate different powers and 
responsibilities for guardians of persons and property. 
Duties of guardians of persons are described in 75-13-
31, UCA 1953, and 75-13-32, describes the duties of 
guardians of property. A case recognizing typical dif-
ferences between the duties of guardians for these dif-
17 
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f erent problems is recognized in OJHare's Guardianship 
(1959), 9 Ut(2d) 181, 341 P(2d) 205. I t is submitted 
that in this connection there is no relevant difference in 
the guardianship of children and adults; no difference 
in the status or powers of guardianship of children and 
adults is made by the statute in this respect, cf. In Re 
Adoption of Frasch (1949), 165 Pa. Sup. 75, 67 Atl 
(2d) 830. 
Substantially in point is the case of State ex rel. v. 
Standefer (Mo. App. 1959), 328 SW(2d) 739 where a 
petition was filed for the appointment of a guardian of 
the person and estate of Standefer. Standefer was an 
adult charged with a felony in the magistrate's court. 
The probate judge dismissed the petition. The Appellate 
Court reversed and held that while the probate judge 
under these circumstances had no authority to conduct 
a hearing with respect to the appointment of a guardian 
because of the criminal jurisdiction of the magistrate's 
court over Standefer's person, it was error to refuse 
to hold a hearing with respect to the appointment of a 
guardian of the property. The Appellate court noted 
that the Missouri statute contemplated guardians of 
persons and property with two distinct characteristics. 
"We are of the opinion that the judge of the 
probate court had not only the power but also the 
duty to inquire into (only) whether Standefer 
was so incompetent as to require the appointment 
of a guardian over his estate to the end that his 
property might be gathered and preserved." 
The instant petition prayed for letters of general guar-
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dianship under Section 75-13-29. Thus the issue was 
presented as to whether a guardian should be appointed 
for the person as well as the property of Joan. 
I t is submitted that the trial court could not reason-
ably have determined as a matter of law on the basis of 
the present record that Joan was not incompetent within 
the meaning of 75-13-20 UCA 1953 as amended. I t 
certainly appears obvious on the other hand that there 
was a considerable amount of evidence already in the 
file to indicate that she was unable "unassisted, to prop-
erly manage and take care of [her] self . . . and by reason 
thereof would likely be deceived or imposed upon by 
artful or designing persons." The file indicates that at 
the age of 23 she had become pregnant three times with-
out having been married at the time of intercourse when 
the children were conceived. (R. 35-36). Three Illinois 
doctors presumably have diagnosed and treated Joan 
for mental or emotional illness or instability. (R. 35-36). 
She was characterized by one of these doctors as being 
"suicidal, withdrawn, accutely depressed and hard to 
contact." (R. 35). A licensed Illinois psychiatrist stated 
that in his opinion she was "suicidal and pre-psychotic." 
These doctors stated that she was unlikely to become well 
without psycho-therapy. While she received psycho-
therapy treatment for a short period of time, she soon 
abandoned it. When her mother was knocked uncon-
scious by George Holle, by whom Joan became preg-
nant, Joan stood nearby "laughing hysterically and say-
ing ' I didn't see a thing.' " (R. 36). Her mother believed 
that she was mentally ill and in need of mental care and 
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treatment, and "she is unable, unassisted, to properly 
manage and take care of herself or her property, that by 
reason thereof, she is likely to be deceived and imposed 
upon by artful or designing persons, and has been so 
imposed upon by George Holle." 
The facts adduced at a hearing on one of respon-
dent's motions held April 17, 1962, point toward the 
need of a guardian. Respondent admitted that all the 
expenses which she was claiming were represented by 
bills sent to George Holle. (R. 161). Holle received 
a bill from the Manhattan Club. He received the light 
and gas bill; the bill from the landlord, and for groce-
ries. (R. 161-162). Holle had arranged that Joan bor-
row $1500 from the bank of Iron County about two 
months previously. (R. 162-163). Joan substantially 
admitted that she was unable to cope with her problems 
with the following explanation: "The problem is, have 
you ever been a woman alone, trying to sign a lease for 
a house or trying to get some sort of credit." (R. 162). 
In June, 1963 Joan had lunch with a cousin in a 
fashionable restaurant in Chicago. During the course of 
the luncheon Joan became hysterical and began scream-
ing: "They are trying to call me a murderer," referring 
to the death of her illegitimate daughter by George 
Holle, born in Utah. She made irrational statements 
and it appeared to her cousin that she was emotionally 
and mentally disturbed. She has been living and cohabit-
ing illicitly with George Holle since moving to Utah, 
despite the fact that her young daughter, Star, lives in 
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the same home. (R. 86). I t is submitted that the credi-
bility of the court would be taxed by an assertion that 
the relationship between Holle and Joan Oelerich does 
not, under the circumstances, amount to an imposition 
upon Joan. The fact that Joan is presently heiress to a 
quarter of a million dollars and prospective heiress of at 
least another quarter million cannot be ignored. I t is 
suggested that if the law enforcement agencies of Salt 
Lake County turn their heads at such circumstances, 
that the steady eyes of a court of law should not fail to 
penetrate them. The applicable statutes impose upon the 
judiciary a duty to determine the relevant facts in the 
circumstances herein presented. 
Neither the provisions of the trust agreement nor 
the circumstances in which it was executed provide any 
mechanics for the safeguard of the person of Joan Oele-
rich. The trustee bank is in Chicago. According to the 
present record, although having lived in Utah for ap-
proximately three years, Joan claims to be a resident 
of Indiana. The petition here alleges that Joan resides 
in Salt Lake County. (R. 5). No provisions of the trust 
pretend to authorize the trustee to take care of Joan. 
I t has, in fact, never been contended by respondent's 
counsel that the trust instrument was an effective sub-
stitute for a guardian of her person if in fact one was 
required. I t is submitted that even if the trust is a valid 
substitute for a claim insofar as Joan's assets are con-
cerned, it is totally and completely inadequate to supply 
the needs of a guardian for her person. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P O I N T I I I . 
P E T I T I O N E R IS E N T I T L E D TO A N 
A D J U D I C A T I O N O F T H E I S S U E S I N H E R 
P E T I T I O N ON I T S M E R I T S . F A I L U R E TO 
A D J U D I C A T E SUCH I S S U E S D E N I E S 
P E T I T I O N E R D U E P R O C E S S O F L A W . 
I t is suggested that the circumstances of the respon-
dent's motion, the granting of which is the subject of 
this appeal, in effect deprives the petitioner of due 
process of law. I t is not suggested here that Rule 56, 
when followed, deprives a party of due process. That 
question has long since been decided. The principles of 
summary judgment have been approved when they 
apply to a situation where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 
pp. 2037-2042, and see General Investment Co. v. Inter 
Borough Rapid Transit Co. (1923), 235 N.Y. 133, 139 
N.E. 216; Lindsey v. Leavy (CCA 9,1945), 149 F (2d) 
899, cert. den. (1946) 326 U.S. 783, 90 L.Ed. 474, 
66S.Ct.-331.-
In the instant case, however, Rule 56 was not fol-
lowed. Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to 
even define the issues of fact, let alone presenting evi-
dence upon them by affidavit or other appropriate pro-
cedure. Although denying defendant's motion to dis-
miss the petition on the ground that it failed to consti-
tute a claim for relief—a ruling, parenthetically, which 
was obviously correct—the probate court arbitrarily 
determined without a hearing that the petition should 
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be denied. None of the recognized procedural safeguards 
were followed. No testimony was taken. Even the deposi-
tions on file were totally ignored. I t is submitted that 
these circumstances constitute a denial of the right of a 
litigant to be heard. If such a ruling was permitted to 
stand, it would constitute a denial of due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. In Jensen v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. (1889), 6 Ut. 253, 21 P . 994, this court 
held that due process of law means: 
". . . that a party shall have his day in court, — 
trial; which means the right of each party, plain-
tiff and defendant, to introduce evidence to estab-
lish his defense upon the part of the other; after 
which comes judgment. Any judgment which is 
rendered without these modes of procedure, or 
in disregard of them, is not 'due process of law.' 
Any other procedure condemns before it hears, 
does not proceed upon inquiry, but renders judg-
ment before trial." 
See also Christiansen v. Harris (1945), 109 Ut. 1, 163 
P(2d) 314. 
SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the trial court in dismissing the peti-
tion under the circumstances of this proceeding consti-
tuted the denial of a reasonable opportunity for a hear-
ing on the merits. The petition was granted without 
compliance with Rule 56 and without any determination 
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of the issues of fact, notwithstanding the ruling of the 
trial judge that the petition stated a claim for relief. 
The grounds given by the trial court in the order of 
dismissal are without any merit or validity. The order 
of dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded 
for appropriate additional proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day of March, 
1964. 
G E O R G E M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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